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Abstract
Waves of successive Devolution Deals are transforming England’s landscape of spatial governance
and transferring new powers to city-regions, facilitating fundamental qualitative policy
reconfigurations and opening up new opportunities as well as new risks for citizens and local
areas. Focused on city-region’s recently emerging roles around employment support policies the
article advances in four ways what are currently conceptually and geographically underdeveloped
literatures on employment support accountability levers. Firstly, the paper dissects weaknesses in
the accountability framework of Great Britain’s key national contracted-out employment support
programme and identifies the potential for city-regions to respond to these weaknesses. Secondly,
the article highlights the centrality of the nationally neglected network accountability lever in
supporting these unemployed individuals and advances this discussion further by introducing to
the literature for the first time a conceptual distinction between what we term ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ forms of these accountably levers that currently remain homogenised within the
literature. Crucially, the argument sets out for the first time in the literature why analytically it
is the positive version of network accountability that is the key – and currently missing at national-
level – ingredient to the design of effective employment support for the priority group of ‘harder-
to-help’ unemployed people who have more complex and/or severe barriers to employment.
Thirdly, the paper argues from a geographical perspective that it is city-regions that are uniquely
positioned in the English context to create the type of positively networked integrated
employment support ‘ecosystem’ that ‘harder-to-help’ individuals in particular require. Finally,
the discussion situates these city-region schemes within their broader socio-economic and
political context and connects with broader debates around the lurching development of
neoliberalism. In doing so it argues that whilst these emerging city-region ecosystem models
offer much progressive potential their relationship to the problematic neoliberal employment
support paradigm remains uncertain given that they refine, embed and indeed buttress that same
neoliberal employment policy paradigm rather than fundamentally challenging or stepping
beyond it.
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Introduction
Multiple and on-going waves of decentralisation are repositioning city-regions –
combinations of contiguous local authority government areas – as key new scales of
government in the English context. Following in the footsteps of London’s now long-
standing mayoral powers, riding high on the back of ‘Devo Manc’ in Greater
Manchester, and situated in the broader political context of devolution of powers to
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, devolution has been close to the top of the UK’s
political agenda since 2010, pushed from the top by former Chancellor George Osborne and
grasped from below by city-regions themselves. Driven by opaque political negotiation, a
geographical patchwork of varying ‘deals’ has emerged across England’s city-regions in
which variable sets of powers and resources have grown – and with generated momentum
continue to grow – iteratively and unevenly across the country. This has created new
opportunities for the reconﬁguration, integration and alignment of local systems and
budgets as well as opening up new risks around the creation of new types and sources of
spatial variation and the decentralisation of new responsibilities and accountabilities in the
context of signiﬁcantly reduced local budgets due to central government commitment to
continued austerity.
This Treasury-fuelled devolutionary zeal has been variably embraced by diﬀerent central
government departments and uncertain governance relationships between national
government and city-regions have become the norm (Pike et al., 2015; Tomaney et al.,
2013). Hence, whilst planning, skills, transport, housing and economic development have
been centre-stage in these scalar shifts, responsibilities over employment support for the
unemployed has until recently remained out of bounds for city-regions in the face of a
highly centrist national Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). However, amidst
persistently disappointing provision and outcomes performance for ‘harder-to-help’
participants – understood as those unemployed individuals with multiple and/or severe
barriers to work – within large national quasi-marketised contracted-out provision, and
an increasing recognition that the status quo cannot continue amidst the ever-tightening
ﬁscal squeeze of austerity, employment support’s devolutionary moment has come.
Although still uncertain within the on-going realpolitik of central-local negotiations, there
is underway in key urban city-regions the beginnings of a step-change in the spatial
governance of traditionally centrist employment support policy, bringing the country
closer to the multi-scalar and multi-agency governance arrangements of activation seen
more usually across the OECD (Minas et al., 2012; van Berkel et al., 2011). This rescaling
or, more accurately, multi-scaling of England’s employment support landscape opens up
genuine new possibilities for substantive transformation towards a markedly more eﬀective
and progressive city-region model of employment support than is seen nationally either
within the ultra-lean public employment service (Jobcentre Plus) or large scale quasi-
marketised and contracted-out provision (e.g. the ‘Work Programme’). Whilst in principle
beneﬁcial to all unemployed individuals, this city-region rescaling oﬀers particular
transformative potential for individuals with more complex and/or severe barriers to
employment given that the national system – whether through Jobcentre Plus or
contracted-out provision – has amply demonstrated that it lacks the resources, integration
and governance frameworks to deliver.
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Demands for the localisation of employment support from the national DWP monopoly
down to a local city-region model have been vocal, determined, and largely from beyond the
academy (CCIN, 2015; Centre for Cities, 2014; IPPR, 2014; LGA, 2015a; ResPublica, 2015;
WPSC, 2015). Hence, despite the existence of related academic literatures around ‘localism’
and ‘new regionalism’ (Cooke, 2006; Jones and Woods, 2013; Lovering, 1999), regional
‘relationality’ and ‘assemblages’ (Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Amin et al., 2003; Jonas,
2012), city-region governance (Storper, 2014) and, indeed, city-region metagovernance
(Etherington and Jones, 2016; Jessop, 2008, 2011), the signiﬁcant conceptual, geographical
and policy implications of these scalar shifts in employment support have to date not been
subjected to critical scholarly reﬂection. This is the task to which this article for the ﬁrst time
responds.
The remainder of the article is structured around four key contributions to the currently
conceptually and geographically underdeveloped literature on employment support
accountability levers. After brieﬂy tracing the recent UK history of the localism agenda
and the laggard, but now emerging, area of employment support within this
devolutionary landscape, the discussion ﬁrstly dissects weaknesses in the accountability
framework of Great Britain’s (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland) key national contracted-out
employment support programme and identiﬁes the potential for city-regions to respond to
these weaknesses. Secondly, the argument highlights the centrality of the network
accountability lever in supporting these participants (despite policy-makers’ obsessions
with market-based accountability levers in such schemes) and advances further both by
introducing for the ﬁrst time a conceptual distinction between what we term ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ forms of these accountably levers that currently remain homogenised within the
literature. Crucially, the argument sets out why it is the positive version of network
accountability that is the key – and currently missing at national-level – ingredient to the
design of eﬀective employment support for the priority group of unemployed people with
more complex and/or severe barriers to employment, in contrast to the ineﬀective ‘negative’
network vision seen within the national contracted-out Work Programme for this group.
Thirdly, the signiﬁcant geographical implications of the discussion are drawn out in terms of
identifying the unique potential of city-regions to provide this type of positively networked
employment support ecosystem. And ﬁnally, the discussion situates these city-region
schemes within their broader socio-economic and political context and connects with
broader debates around the lurching development of neoliberalism (Peck and Theodore,
2012). In doing so it argues that whilst these emerging city-region ecosystem models oﬀer
much progressive potential, their relationship to the problematic neoliberal employment
support paradigm to which they respond remains uncertain given that they may reﬁne,
embed and indeed buttress that same neoliberal employment policy paradigm rather than
fundamentally challenging or stepping beyond it.
Negotiated localism and the glimpse of employment support
If the UK can overall be described in comparative terms as a highly centralised political
system then this caricature underplays the extent to which trends in central, regional and
local powers and responsibilities have waxed and waned over the last century (NAO, 2014).
Sitting in the broader context of processes of devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales, following the election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in
the 2010 general election the 2010 Local Growth Act, 2011 Localism Act and subsequent
waves of politically negotiated ‘Deals’ between central government and English city-regions
– City Deals, Growth Deals and Devolution Deals – have reconﬁgured the nature of spatial
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governance across England. Whilst regions (e.g. Regional Development Agencies, RDAs)
and localities (e.g. New Deal for Communities) have been the scales of interest in recent UK
employment and regeneration activity, the current devolutionary iteration follows the US
focus on ‘metro’ politics through its emphasis on ‘city-regions’ – formalised collaborations of
multiple constituent local authorities that are usually (but not always!) contiguous. These
new city-regions together oﬀer the necessary promise – though not always in reality (Pugalis
and Townsend, 2014) – of the political, economic and social coherence and scale required to
fulﬁl their strategic economic growth objectives.
At the heart of these shifts has been the replacement across England of large RDAs with
the still evolving and uneasy smaller city-region Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs)
governance landscape, which has, in the words of Vince Cable, the former Secretary of
State heading the responsible central government department for Business, Innovation
and Skills, been ‘a little Maoist and chaotic’ (Cable, quoted in Stratton, 2010: 1). Created
in 2011, LEPs are business-led bodies with local authority representation that have been
established at this city-region scale as they key strategic players to drive through local
economic growth. To achieve their economic objectives business-led LEPs work in
conjunction with political Combined Authorities (CAs) that oﬀer a new layer of city-
regional political governance with its own leadership, staﬀ and functions and
that incorporate into its governance structure the Chief Executives of the multiple
(usually 6–10) constituent Local Authorities within its boundaries.
CAs vary widely in their make-up, activities and ambitions, a reﬂection in part of their
spatially sandwiched position between central government above and constituent local
authorities below and the political reality that the space that CAs are enabled to ﬁll
shrinks and expands according to negotiations with these key stakeholders in both
directions. Pertinent to the present argument are the city-regions of the larger urban cores
– London, Greater Manchester, Sheﬃeld City Region, West Midlands, Liverpool City
Region, and so on – who are powering ahead in terms of their devolutionary ambition
and journey. Despite this continually shifting patchwork quilt of diﬀering city-region
powers, common city-region responsibilities exist around economic development,
planning, housing, transport and skills. Although intimately intertwined with these
devolving policy areas, employment support for the unemployed has remained largely out
of scope for city-regions, a reﬂection both of the strong centrist tendencies of the national
DWP as well as the nationally dominated policy landscape of public employment service
Jobcentre Plus provision and the national quasi-marketised and contracted-out provision. In
the leading urban city-regions, however, employment support is now too being dragged
squarely onto the devolutionary negotiation table, with signiﬁcant transformative
potential resulting for its qualitative reconﬁguration around better integrated support and,
as a consequence, improved experiences and outcomes for unemployed individuals.
Key to that national DWP employment support oﬀer is the contracted-out Work
Programme scheme for the long-term unemployed and it is this scheme that has become
the benchmark and touchstone for select city-regions’ entries into the employment support
landscape. Implemented in 2011, Work Programme is a large scale quasi-marketised
programme that has worked with around 2 million unemployed individuals since 2011 at
a total cost of around »3–4 billion. Work Programme is structured geographically into 18
large regional Contract Package Areas (CPAs) across England, Scotland and Wales each
containing two or three large and well-capitalised ‘prime providers’ to whom participants are
randomly allocated after an initial period of Jobcentre Plus provision (usually following nine
to twelve months of unemployment). Primes can both deliver services themselves and/or sub-
contract to organisations within their supply chains. With a ‘black box’ approach the
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programme furnishes providers with almost complete ﬂexibility over the type and frequency of
support for participants. Outcomes rather than process is the key interest and at the heart of
the scheme is a strong payment-by-results (PbR) model that is heavily weighted (and since
2014 entirely weighted) towards paying only for sustained job outcomes. Work Programme is
not targeted on particular groups of unemployed people and, in recognition of the enormous
variability in its participants, payment levels vary across nine payment groups to which
individuals are allocated according to a crude notion of their relative distance from the
labour market based on beneﬁt type – either Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Employment
Support Allowance (ESA) where claimants have oﬃcially acknowledged disabilities.
Somewhat ironically given its centralising credentials, it is Work Programme itself that
has laid the groundwork for localising activation pressures due to its disappointing
performance for participants with more complex and/or severe support needs in
particular. Weaknesses within the programme’s accountability framework (discussed
below) have left the scheme susceptible to the under-resourcing, poor performance and
‘parking’ (i.e. absolute or relative neglect) of participants considered unlikely to
(inexpensively and/or securely) achieve payable job outcomes for providers. The main
ESA claimant group has for example seen only 7% of claimants achieving a job outcome
(measured as sustained work of three months) within a year of referral (DWP, 2015a). Nor
do participants’ experiences of Work Programme inspire conﬁdence, with basic and generic
provision the norm and growing evidence of systemic ‘parking’ of harder-to-help
participants (Lane et al., 2013; Meager et al., 2013; Newton et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013).
Sitting within this context of disappointing Work Programme experiences and
performance for harder-to-help participants, the calls for greater city-region involvement
in employment support have been vocal, unrelenting and impossible for the DWP to ignore
(CCIN, 2015; Centre for Cities, 2014; IPPR, 2014; LGA, 2015a; ResPublica, 2015; WPSC,
2015). Building on momentum created by local pilot programmes in Greater Manchester
(Working Well), central London (Working Capital) and Glasgow and the Clyde Valley
(Working Matters), employment support powers were a notable feature within the latest
round of Autumn 2015 Devolution Deals for several of the larger, more urbanised city-
region frontrunners across England. Two employment items within these deals are of
particular relevance: ﬁrstly, the ability for further integrated employment support pilot
programmes in other city-region areas; and, secondly, co-design/co-commissioning of the
upcoming Work and Health Programme. This programme will from late 2017 replace Work
Programme and the smaller Work Choice (a scheme intended for, but poorly targeted on,
individuals with more severe health conditions and disabilities) as the country’s main quasi-
marketised and contracted-out employment support programme, though with only a
fraction of the budget of its forerunners (DWP, 2015b).
An embryonic yet radical set of shifts in the scale, qualitative conﬁguration and
quantitative performance potential of employment support are therefore underway in the
more urbanised city-region areas across England, a trend sure to continue as DWP’s
devolutionary inertia is gradually chipped away at and as these city-region’s await the
imminent arrival of elected mayors with new powers, ambitions and public mandates. At
the heart of the change is the vision from city-regions of the progressive creation of locally
integrated employment support ‘ecosystems’ that strategically and operationally align and
coordinate a range of what are currently siloed and disconnected key wraparound support
services and budgets. These supports need to be brought together and marshalled in order to
enable the delivery of whole-person holistic keyworker support packages encompassing the
range of individuals’ support needs – personalised employment advice, skills, health,
housing, ﬁnancial advice, family support, etc. This qualitatively reconﬁgured locally
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integrated ecosystem model of employment support that city-region rescaling allows brings
with it transformative potential for signiﬁcant performance uplift and system savings (both
centrally and locally), particularly in relation to unemployed individuals with more complex
and/or severe barriers to employment.
These intertwined shifts between the geographical scale of employment support,
accountability levers, and programme nature and performance remain absent from critical
scrutiny within the academic literature however, despite their importance both for our
understanding of shifting patterns of spatial governance as well as the linked conceptual
and geographical nature of employment support accountability levers. The next section
begins this discussion by considering the nature of the existing accountability mechanisms
running through the national contracted-out Work Programme scheme from which the
emerging city-region ecosystem models ﬂow and to whose failings they respond.
Accountability weaknesses in the UK Work Programme:
Opportunities for city-regions
To unpick city-regions’ entry point through Work Programme into the devolutionary
employment support policy arena, the analytical framework of accountability mechanisms
to understand the design and performance of employment support programmes is a
powerful approach, but one that remains conceptually as well as geographically
underdeveloped at present. Building on the broader employment support governance
literature (Considine, 2001; Newman, 2001), as well as that limited literature which does
focus speciﬁcally on accountability mechanisms in employment support (Jantz et al., 2015),
ﬁve heuristic approaches to understanding accountability mechanisms within the ﬁeld of
employment support are identiﬁable – procedural, corporate, market, network and
democratic. These can be summarised as follows:
. Procedural accountability draws on rule-based principles and norms of reliability and
procedural fairness where public servants follow set processes, rules and requirements;
. Corporate accountability utilises contractualised performance targets to monitor and
compare provider performance so as to reward or punish providers accordingly (e.g.
contract renewals/terminations, additional/reduced referrals or payments);
. Market accountability steers using levers of price and competition between providers. The
provision of contracted-out employment activation schemes is equated with ‘natural’
clearing markets of abstracted rational economic theory, even if such schemes are in
many ways, and with key implications, artiﬁcial quasi-marketised creations. PbR,
accelerator pricing, or other ﬁnancial incentives/sanctions for good/bad performance
typify market accountability levers;
. Democratic accountability responds transparently to the views of citizens and users.
Whilst Jantz et al. (2015) focus ‘top-down’ on the accountability of politicians though
the electoral cycle, we would also include possible ‘bottom-up’ democratic accountability
through user experience via levers of ‘voice’ (e.g. feedback, complaints, service rating) and
‘choice’ (e.g. provider and/or intervention selection and exit) to drive service quality
(Hirschman, 1970).
. Network accountability coordinates provision across multiple, inter-dependent service
providers using relationships based on trust. Softer informal levers around the
collective need for organisations to protect reputations and foster on-going
relationships of co-operation and co-dependence oﬀer informal and collectively-
enforced network accountability mechanisms (Olson, 1965).
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Although Work Programme on paper incorporates elements from each of these ﬁve
accountability types, it is in practice imbalanced and undermined by its disproportionate
reliance on the market-based PbR lever. The programme is also partial in the sense that it is
dependent on what we below describe as ‘negative’ defensive versions of these accountability
levers, and problematic in its weak operationalisation of several of those already partial
‘negative’ accountability visions. The consequences for programme performance, for
participants, and for taxpayer value-for-money have been predictably disappointing from
the outset, though the lack of any robust impact evaluation makes it diﬃcult to establish
quantitatively the full scale of these weaknesses.
Procedural and democratic accountability mechanisms play a relatively insigniﬁcant role
in practice within Work Programme. Procedurally, minimum service guarantees (MSGs)
were submitted to the DWP by prime providers in tender documents and make promises
around the frequency, type and quality of employment support to be oﬀered to participants
within their contract. These MSGs suﬀer however from their wide variability and frequent
vagueness which hinders their standardisation, clarity and sometimes enforceability. There is
also considerable variability in the communication of MSGs to participants such that
programme participants are routinely not aware of the type of support they ought to
expect. A clear opportunity therefore exists for city-regions to enhance the design and
eﬀectiveness of this procedural accountability lever.
In terms of democratic accountability mechanisms, although select committees and media
coverage have on occasions made for uncomfortable moments for DWP ministers the eﬀects
are relatively short-term and modest. In terms of bottom-up user-led democratic
accountability levers Work Programme does not attempt to enable participants to utilise
‘choice’ accountability levers, despite market logics dominating programme design on the
provider side. The limits of the MSGs constrain the traction of the ‘voice’ lever. City-region
schemes could think more ambitiously about how individuals might be empowered to use
their agency to drive the quality and eﬀectiveness of support, particularly via mechanisms to
incorporate and utilise service user ‘voice’ (e.g. genuinely collaborative action planning,
participant feedback ratings).
Corporate governance levers apply in the form of contractually prescribed minimum
performance levels (MPLs) that operate across key programme payment groups. These
are used by DWP to make incentive payments for exceptional performance, terminate
contracts for poor performance and shift referral volumes to better performing prime
providers within CPAs. A key weakness of the original MPL measure was that its
numerator (job outcomes within a set period) did not relate to the same individuals as its
denominator (referrals within a set period), meaning that ‘improving performance’ could,
other things equal, be ‘achieved’ simply by falling referral volumes over time, which has been
the trend in practice over the lifetime of Work Programme. This has not only undermined
the utility of these MPLs as a corporate-based accountability lever but has also led to DWP
being contractually obliged to pay incentive payments in the face of performance concerns as
well as facing diﬃculties in terminating contracts for the most concerning primes.
Unsurprisingly, the DWP have over time introduced an alternative MPL measure that
was suggested to it at the outset by commentators based on the percentage of the cohort
achieving a job outcome within twelve months. City-regions should adopt this cohort
measure and should in addition give consideration to the inclusion of further intermediate
targets around overcoming barriers and reducing the distance to paid work (as in the Greater
Manchester Working Well employment support pilot) (GMCA, 2015) as well as to equity
measures that compare performance between key sub-groups of interest (e.g. diﬀerent types
of claimants, diﬀerent types of local labour markets).
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It is though market levers that represent the key accountability instrument of Work
Programme in the form of a heavily (and since 2014 entirely) outcome focussed PbR
model of diﬀerentiated payments across the nine payments groups. This is argued by the
DWP to drive performance, to deliver value-for-money and to encourage providers to work
responsively and in a highly personalised way with participants with diverse support needs
and costs. Work Programme PbR is, however, now widely agreed to be an overly crude and
badly calibrated PbR framework both in terms of the internal heterogeneity of the payment
groups as well as in the levels and sequencing of its payments (Carter and Whitworth, 2015;
Inclusion and NIACE, 2015). As a result, this market accountability lever designs in rather
than designs out perverse incentives for providers to systemically ‘cream’ the most job-ready
participants and ‘park’ those with more complex barriers to work (Carter and Whitworth,
2015; WPSC, 2015). Starved of cash, acutely aware of risk around spend, and focused on
short-term outcomes to trigger payments, prime providers have pursued risk-minimising
cost-reduction strategies to proﬁt. There is evidence consistent with the ‘parking’ of more
challenging individuals and scant use of referrals to more specialist or intensive services
(Meager et al., 2014; Newton et al., 2012). For harder-to-help participants a downwards
spiral of underfunding, poor performance and vulnerability to ‘parking’ has been the result
(Inclusion and NIACE, 2015). In response, city-regions have the opportunity to recalibrate
the PbR design in order to convert the incentive framework facing providers from one
facilitating ‘parking’ to one incentivising support. It is now widely accepted that the
payments proﬁle for harder-to-help participants should include a stable up-front
attachment or service fee of around 20–30% of the total payment proﬁle (WPSC, 2015)
and there is little evidence to suggest that on-going sustainment payments have brought
value in terms of in-work support to those who have moved into work (Meager et al., 2014).
Re-weighting the payments proﬁle in this way would help both to de-risk and increase up-
front investment in harder-to-help individuals in order to support them over the main hurdle
of initial entry into paid work whilst at the same time helping to squeeze far more value from
the same ﬁnancial spend.
Positively networked employment support, and the unique potential
of city-regions to deliver it
There is then much that city-regions can improve in their localised employment support
programmes in response to clear and signiﬁcant weaknesses in Work Programme’s
accountability mechanisms across these four procedural, democratic, corporate and
market accountability spaces. Although the shoring up of these mechanisms as they are
currently conceived is necessary to support harder-to-help participants, we suggest that
such revisions are unable, in themselves, to be suﬃcient in unlocking the qualitatively and
quantitatively diﬀerent services required to adequately support those with more complex
and/or severe support needs.
Instead, the currently nationally neglected network accountability lever becomes the key,
game-changing accountability lever. Moreover, key to understanding the nature of the
employment support system that is required in order to eﬀectively support those with
more complex and/or severe barriers to work is our introduction to the literature for the
ﬁrst time of a conceptual distinction between what we term ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ versions
of each of these accountability levers that is currently absent within a literature that ignores
and, arguably more dangerously, inappropriately homogenises the distinct visions and
approaches to these ﬁve accountability dimensions. Introducing this conceptual distinction
to the literature enables for the ﬁrst time the recognition that it is speciﬁcally the ‘positively’
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conceived vision of this network accountability that is the key to enabling enhanced
employment support for individuals with more complex and/or severe barriers to
employment, and that city-regions are uniquely able to deliver this positive network
accountability in their employment programmes.
Hence, and stepping back from the paper’s speciﬁc focus for a moment, we support the
need to move beyond analytically over-simplistic depictions of employment support systems
in terms of singular accountability dimensions and to progress instead towards far greater
attention to accountability hybridity within these complex systems (Jantz et al., 2015). More
fully, however, we argue that the required sensitivity to accountability hybridity must
incorporate not only the constellations of, and interactions between, diﬀerent
accountability dimensions but, critically, must also include sensitivity to the distinct
conceptual forms that those dimensions can take as well as the related spatial scales at
which they do, can, and (in terms of their eﬀectiveness) ought to operate. Hence, in order
to understand the complexities of employment support systems not only does the study of
accountability need to develop analytically to understand hybridity across the ﬁve
accountability dimensions, but it must do so whilst taking more seriously the complex
multi-scalar interactions between conceptually distinct forms of those accountability levers.
Table 1 summarises the conceptual distinction between our proposed ‘negative’ and
‘positive’ visions of each of the ﬁve possible accountability dimensions. Whilst introduced
to the accountability literature here for the ﬁrst time, the conceptual origins of this
distinction can be traced to a similar distinction made within classic works of political
philosophy between negative/positive liberty (Berlin, 1969). For Berlin, negative liberty
refers to the absence of constraints on an individual within an area (e.g. set of activities)
in which subjects are considered to warrant the ability to do or be as they wish without
interference from others. In contrast, positive liberty relates to the presence of control or self-
mastery in terms of an individual’s ability to actively formulate the desired vision of
themselves and their life and to themselves have the ability to self-direct towards those
self-deﬁned aims. In terms of their usage for us within our two visions of negative and
positive accountability levers within employment support policies, the ‘negative’ versions
of these ﬁve accountability dimensions emphasise eﬃciency and risk-minimisation and seek
to minimise undesirable behaviours and outcomes more than they seek to maximise desirable
behaviours and outcomes. Hence, as with negative liberty, negative accountability levers
Table 1. Heuristic typology of negative and positive conceptualisations of accountability dimensions.
Negative version of accountability
mechanism seen in Work Programme
Positive version of accountability
mechanism
Procedural Minimum Service Guarantees Maximum service guarantees
Corporate Minimum performance levels (MPLs)
focused narrowly on triggering
employment/earnings outcomes and
progression irrespective of well-
being
Minimum performance levels (MPLs)
focused broadly on progression
towards, and then progression in,
quality work that supports well-
being
Market PbR incentivising cost-cutting and
‘parking’ to drive profit
PbR incentivising innovation, risk-taking
and universal support to drive profit
Democratic Top-down ministerial responsibilisation;
participant complaints process
Bottom-up service user co-production
in design and management
Network Merlin supply chain management Local Integration Boards
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focus defensively on downside protections and mitigations against undue risk exposure,
potentially losing possible opportunities to maximise desirable behaviours and outcomes on
the upside. In contrast, ‘positively’ conﬁgured versions of these accountability dimensions
focus progressively on upside ambitions around performance, equity, opportunity-
maximisation, and self-realisation over concerns of eﬃciency or risk-minimisation. They
therefore focus more on seeking to maximise desirable behaviours and outcomes on the
upside more than minimising undesirable behaviours and outcomes on the downside,
potentially introducing some additional risks and costs into the system in the process.
As the discussion in the previous section has outlined, Table 1 highlights the dominance of
negative accountability visions within the UK Work Programme across the procedural,
corporate, market and democratic accountability dimensions, though it fails to convey the
design weaknesses and imbalanced reliance on the market accountability lever. The key
focus here however relates to the nationally neglected network accountability dimension,
and in particular the transformative potential of its positive conﬁguration.
Focusing on this network accountability dimension, Work Programme once again
displays a negative version of this lever in the form of the Merlin standard applied to
prime providers’ management of their supply chains that aims to protect smaller sub-
prime organisations from exploitation by their overarching prime provider. It is a moot
point to what extent Merlin has been able to realise this aim. Merlin has not in practice
been able to prevent the well-capitalised primes from cascading down signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
risk to their sub-primes by simply passing down the same heavily, and then fully, outcome-
based PbR terms that the DWP intended to be borne only by primes via the inclusion during
procurement of a »20 million turnover threshold in relation to primes, but not to sub-primes
(Foster et al., 2014: 128–130; Lane et al., 2013: 35). More fundamentally, the supply chains
submitted by primes during the procurement process have in many ways not actually come
to exist in practice. Primes have not referred participants to specialist providers in the
volumes expected, or have disproportionately referred the most complex (and expensive)
cases, starving smaller sub-prime organisations of referrals and of income ﬂows (Foster
et al., 2014; Meager et al., 2013). Where referrals have occurred there is evidence to
suggest that they have been driven more by primes looking for low or no cost services
(often outside of their supply chain) rather than more appropriate, specialist or intensive
services (Newton et al., 2012).
Network accountability inside the Work Programme has therefore embodied another
negatively conﬁgured version of this accountability dimension, and has at that failed to
mitigate the downside risks and perversities that it was designed to control. Irrespective of
its eﬃcacy or otherwise this Work Programme approach to network accountability is a
fundamentally negative version that never had even the potential to deliver the type of
integrated holistic employment support that harder-to-help participants require as this can
only be created via a positive version of this same network accountability lever. This
positively conﬁgured network accountability vision instead recognises that its key function
for the eﬀective support these individuals is to create and dynamically maintain a co-
ordinated and integrated employment support ecosystem. That is, a system comprising all
of the holistic wrap-around services required to respond eﬀectively to the varied set of
barriers faced by this group – employment support, health, skills, housing, advice
services, debt advice, food and energy security, and so on. The emerging city-region
employment model can best be described in this way as the co-ordinated development of
an employment support ecosystem of integrated services and budgets that are bent into, and
wrapped around, participants and their keyworkers in the pursuit of sustained employment
objectives.
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Central government clearly recognises the need for locally integrated employment support
ecosystems of this type, as seen in its creation of the joint Work and Health Unit (WHU)
between the DWP and Department of Health centrally and its collaborative working with
city-regions around the development of health-led employment trials, DWP’s push for
service integration and co-location within its Universal Support policy, or Work and
Pensions Select Committee recommendations and Government responses (WPSC, 2015).
They are right to do so.
However, neither policymakers nor the academic community have yet acknowledged
that the pursuit of such city-level policies necessitate far greater attention to the
development of the positively networked accountability dimension. This in turn requires
the creation and on-going maintenance of new formalised governance arrangements to
bring it about and it is this that brings signiﬁcant geographical implications around the
optimal – indeed necessary – local spatial scale at which this must be cultivated. For with
the exception of the positively conﬁgured approach to network accountability all negative
and positive conceptualisations of all ﬁve accountability dimensions can in principle be
delivered by any geographical scale.
Crucially, however, the type of positive network accountability key to the eﬀective
employment support for those with more complex and/or severe barriers to work can only
be delivered at local scales for it is only at local scales that the strategic visioning, senior
decision-making powers and operational responsibilities over the range of key wraparound
supports reside. The new local governance structures to facilitate precisely this type of
positively networked accountability – Local Integration Boards (LIBs) as they are coming
to be named – are embryonically appearing across city-regions as they take forwards their
Devolution Deal employment support pilot items. These LIBs perform the key function of
bringing together key stakeholders from the various wraparound support systems involved
(mental and physical health providers and commissioners, colleges, housing services,
beneﬁts advice, ﬁnancial and debt advice, Jobcentre Plus colleagues, etc.). They provide
a formalised governance mechanism to enable both senior strategic commitment to the on-
going dynamic local processes of gradually increasing strategic system alignment and,
where appropriate, integration (e.g. of objectives, delivery, procurement, budgeting,
referrals, co-location, culture change, etc.). They also provide an operational forum for
co-case management of individual complex cases in order to join up keyworkers with a
whole-person holistic support package with the range of multiple wraparound support
services that participants with more complex and/or severe barriers to work variously
require but that remain disconnected without the concerted eﬀort, coordination and
formalised governance of LIBs at local scales.
Whilst it is clear for these reasons that the formation of employment support ecosystems
is by necessity a local project, there is however a debate to be had about whether the optimal
scale is that of the city-region or, rather, that of the constituent and smaller local authority
(municipality) administrative unit that in the English context is the mainstay of local
political power and activity. Both are in principle possible and the model that is emerging
currently across the city-regions at the forefront of this activity (Greater Manchester,
London, Sheﬃeld City Region) is a sensible hybrid of the two scales in which LIB
governance arrangements are formed at local authority level and with city-region CAs
acting as the key co-ordinating layer at which overarching programme design,
procurement, and performance management occur. The formation of LIBs at local
authority levels in this way reﬂects both their strong political identity and the extensive
organisation of staﬀ, services, budgets and governance at this well-established scale.
However, rather than rely solely on single local authorities as the scale at which to build
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locally integrated employment support ecosystems, CAs oﬀer a sensible overarching
coordinating scale for its development across its several constituent local authorities. This
is in part a reﬂection of the current political reality that it is at city-region and not local
authority scale that central government negotiate devolution, a situation likely to be
reinforced by the imminent arrival of elected mayors with new ambitions and mandates
across key city-regions. City-regions also oﬀer an appropriate scale economically and
geographically. Economically city-region geographies are built around the footprint of
functional economic areas, often containing one (or more) urban core(s) and multiple
surrounding areas, with strong commuter travel ﬂows within that geography. This
functional economic area oﬀers a suitable geography from which to approach labour
market policies such as these. This is particularly so when noting the centrality of
demand-side as well as supply-side strategies in modern activation policies, especially in
relation to people with more complex and/or severe barriers to employment. Finally,
although generally not perfectly coterminous, city-region boundaries present stronger
coterminosity than do local authorities to key Jobcentre Plus district boundaries and this
facilitates the simplicity and eﬀectiveness of their necessary collaboration within any
localised employment activity.
City-region employment support ecosystems and the lurching
development of neoliberalism
The analysis of England’s emerging city-region employment support ecosystems through the
new lens of diﬀerentiated positive and negative accountability presents important insights to
our understanding of city-region governance and employment support accountability
frameworks as well as to the creation of transformative policy opportunities for the type
of employment support that is able to be delivered for individuals with complex and/or
severe needs. The analytical result is a clearer recognition of what is needed to deliver the
country’s much-needed step-change in employment support programmes, experiences and
performance for people with more severe and/or complex barriers to work (positively
networked employment support ecosystems), why it is needed (integrated and adequately
resourced services and budgets for whole-person holistic support), how it can be brought
about (formalised and dynamic local governance frameworks to create and maintain multi-
system strategic and operational alignment and coordination), and who in a geographic sense
is uniquely able to deliver it (city-regions working in collaboration with local authorities, not
central government).
For those of a centre-left disposition these emerging positively networked city-region
employment support ecosystem models oﬀer a version of employment support that may
be both markedly more progressive and more eﬀective for those with complex needs
compared with a lean national oﬀer in which average duration of advisor meetings is
around four minutes. The DWP spend on employment support is around a quarter to a
third of the share of GDP that comparable OECD nations spend (Eurostat, 2016), and an
already lean DWP departmental budget is estimated to fall by 45% between 2010 and 2020
(Resolution Foundation, 2015).
The progressivity of these speciﬁc shifts towards localised employment support
ecosystems in countering the signiﬁcant failings of the Work Programme’s neoliberal
approach to quasi-marketised employment support, however, also depends critically on
the broader context within which these localised schemes operate. Work on neoliberalism
highlights not only that it remains a ‘rascal concept’ (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 178) but also
that it is a highly malleable and resilient project that thrives oﬀ its own crises such that it
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‘displays a lurching dynamic, marked by social policy failure and improvised adaptation’
(Peck and Theodore, 2012: 178). Unlike its lofty, unrealistic textbook accounts,
neoliberalism in practice survives by virtue of its ‘shape-shifting character’ through
‘opportunistic moments, workarounds and on-the-hoof recalibrations’ as policy-makers
‘‘‘lean into’’ crises of their own making, extemporising ‘downstream’ responses in
resulting disarray, but at the same time nudging the programme of liberalisation-cum-
desocialisation forward on a zigzagging course’ (Peck and Theodore, 2012: 179). In this
vein, it can also be argued on two dimensions that from the performance crisis of the
negative neoliberalism of the national Work Programme comes a rescaled localised
masterstroke for that same neoliberal paradigm of employment support rather than any
fundamental progressive reconﬁguration of it.
An initial dimension of consideration is the broader context of England’s spatially
unequal economy within which city-region employment support schemes occupy
particular geographical pockets – some economically buoyant, some far less so.
Exacerbating those long-standing spatial inequalities in recent years has been the public
sector budget cuts resulting from the central government policy decision of on-going
austerity, an approach softened somewhat after George Osborne’s departure from the role
of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Whilst it is the case that devolution creates opportunities for
city-regions to work smarter and do more with less by better integrating and aligning local
services and budgets, the viability of these potential eﬃciencies is inevitably balanced against
the dramatically shrinking total resource available. Between 2010 and 2015 local authorities’
real spending per person has been cut by around 23% and with further cuts planned the total
reduction between 2010 and 2020 is estimated to be 37% in real terms (LGA, 2015b: 11). In
this challenging ﬁscal context, whilst there are important ways in which city-regions can
drive economic growth in their areas they are reliant on supportive underlying macro-level
trends that are largely beyond their control but that are integral to providing the economic
potential with which their city-region levers can interact.
Thus, whilst the rescaling of employment support to city-region level may well be
necessary to eﬀectively support harder-to-help participants, there is also a risk that such
localisation may further embed, as well as legitimise politically, already existing patterns of
spatial inequality due to the tendency for devolution to unrealistically reposition city-regions
as autonomous areas abstracted from broader macro-level structural patterns down to which
regressively containerised economic risk and responsibility can be dumped by central
government (Etherington and Jones, 2009; Peck, 2002, 2012). Work on austerity cities in
the US context (Peck, 2012) conveys powerfully the socio-spatially regressive path that such
a route of unrealistic economic containerisation might create for English city-regions in the
future. Concerning in this regard in the English context is a notable inversion within central
government framing of devolution from a logic of redistribution to one where poorer regions
are instead portrayed increasingly as a millstone around the neck of more prosperous
southern areas (Etherington and Jones, 2009).
A second key dimension in need of consideration for a rounded assessment of the
progressivity of these city-region schemes relates to conversations around their
particularised – albeit softened – adoption of the same neoliberal paradigm of
employment support. Within city-region ecosystem models of employment support quasi-
marketisation and PbR continue to operate, although – and importantly – with a higher
weighting towards supporting all participants and secure up-front attachment payments
when compared to the national Work Programme model. Crucially, however, these
‘results’ payments are received only by the contracted-out prime provider supplying the
keyworkers at the heart of the model. In terms of the city-region wrap-around integrated
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infrastructure of support services – health, skills, advice services, housing, and so on – it is
city-regions’ budgets and systems that are bent around those primes to enable them to more
eﬀectively trigger outcome payments for local unemployed residents. Those wider systems
receive none of the outcome payments, justiﬁed – in part reasonably – by the expected
budget savings and reductions in demand for those wraparound services as result of these
positive employment outcomes.
To be sure, the type of neoliberal employment support model seen within these emerging
city-region schemes is radically softer than the DWP’s national approach to contracted-out
provision as depicted in the Work Programme and the expectations around the future Work
and Health Programme. Yet at heart city-region rescaling tweaks rather than fundamentally
reconﬁgures the now widespread neoliberal paradigm of employment support that has
strong traction with DWP policy makers, despite the traceability of the city-region scalar
ﬁx back to the signiﬁcant shortcomings of that neoliberal employment support paradigm as
seen in Work Programme as well as in the broader international evidence base (Bredgaard
and Larsen, 2008; de Graaf and Sirovatka, 2012; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005; van
Berkel et al., 2011). Instead, neoliberalism’s grip on England’s employment support
landscape can in some ways be argued to be further embedded, buttressed and indeed
subsidised through these devolutionary programmes, despite their transformative
progressive intent and potential. For in seeking locally progressive alternatives within the
ideological and political constraints in which these devolutionary negotiations take place
city-regions inject new resources (both in-kind services and cash), new governance
frameworks (for service co-ordination and performance oversight) and new logics
(relationships, trust and care in the positive network accountability vision) as they seek to
both better protect and better support harder-to-help individuals from the acknowledged
shortcomings of the neoliberal employment support framework.
Yet they do not fundamentally step beyond it, at least not in this early wave of
devolutionary employment support activity. Thus, if localisation of employment support to
city-regions has been described as a scalar ﬁx to the problems of the neoliberal paradigm of
employment support then it is perhaps far from clear whether the ﬁx is more for unemployed
programme participants or for that underlying neoliberal project. The question for progressive
scholars and city-region policy makers is whether the internal contradictions of the resulting
city-region employment support model are worth bearing in order to better support their
unemployed citizens who face more signiﬁcant barriers to work.
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